In the early cold war the British government founded a voluntary civil defence service designed to protect the nation and the population from the effects of enemy attack in the event of war. Although civil defence was a site of massive voluntary effort -around 500,000 people joined -it was also considered a 'failure'. This article examines the propaganda utilised to recruit these volunteers in the 'atomic age', and argues that the messages used reveal a range of concerns about the conflict, patriotism and voluntarism in the early postwar years which existed in tension. In particular, it analyses the tensions between duty and service on the one hand, and leisure on the other, symptomatic of the wider debates surrounding citizenship and participation in the period. It also explains the importance of the Second World War and the gendered perceptions of civil defence in attempting to mobilise potential recruits. The article concludes that civil defence propaganda succeeded in mobilising significant levels of participation, but was perceived as failure due to an understanding of patriotic citizenship rooted in the cultural context of the Second World War. In a period of cultural change, propaganda began to emphasise leisure as well as duty, but struggled to reconcile the two messages in a way capable of convincing recruits in large enough numbers.
2 people involved were impressive, rising throughout the early 1950s to amount to more than 500,000 people by the end of 1953.
2 Recruitment faltered from 1954 as the potential horrors of thermonuclear warfare undermined the credibility of civil defence, and after 1960 numbers declined sharply as untrained or 'inefficient' members were purged from the different organisations and new recruitment struggled to make up the shortfall. 3 The hydrogen bomb threw civil defence into crisis and recruitment propaganda from 1954 onwards was designed to forestall criticisms of the government's nuclear policy by promoting the idea of civil defence as a worthwhile response to the nuclear threat. Voluntary civil defence during the 'atomic age', a period of rapid if uneven expansion between 1949 and early 1954, can be seen as a site of significant public engagement with the cold war. It was a period when the rich propaganda developed to inspire voluntary recruitment conveyed a variety of diverse and changing messages reflecting the changing social and cultural discourse surrounding participation and citizenship.
The recruitment propaganda produced in atomic age Britain reflected the assumptions within political culture about the nature of the cold war and the role of the individual in fighting it. 4 In seeking to attract recruits the value of civil defence was emphasised: the need for it, and its ability to undertake its allotted task. The messages and representations selected for these purposes are repositories of meaning and by analysing this material we can illuminate both how cold war service was constructed by the government in early 1950s Britain and the cultural space it occupied. Initially, the assumptions built into recruiting propaganda were characterised by notions of duty and patriotism, with civil defence represented as part of the individual's obligation to defend the nation. In projecting these messages, the government borrowed heavily from ideas of service current in the Second World War. 5 Although designed to establish the need 3 for patriotic voluntary action, these wartime-inspired messages also served to destabilise the idea of civil defence as a necessary part of Britain's atomic defence. Moreover, to construct civil defence in this way was to put forward a citizenship discourse which was contingent on the public identifying with these motifs of self-sacrifice and duty and associating them with the cold war threat. As became clear in the early 1950s, such a citizenship discourse was in fact divorced from popular conceptions of the role of the individual in post-1945 Britain. In fact, civil defence can be seen as an indicator of changes effecting Britain as a whole, with people retreating from the national and local, and concentrating instead on the domestic, 'apolitical' issues of home, family and wealth. 6 Given these factors, it was unsurprising that recruitment failed to live up to the government's high expectations.
We can see how changes made to the message after the initial push, reducing the emphasis on patriotism and the duty of citizens, were reactions to the 'failure' of civil defence recruitment. Adapting propaganda to broaden the appeal of civil defence reflected the broader shift within British popular culture away from the 'national' and towards the individual or domestic. Civil defence from 1951 was represented as inclusive, providing associational opportunities and leisure satisfaction. Its core message of participation in national defence was also adapted, stressing 'patriotism' less and emphasising that to serve in civil defence was to fight for peace and to protect the local community. In constructing civil defence as a valuable and rewarding pursuit, messages became increasingly gendered in order to appeal to both sexes. Although the focus on leisure improved recruitment levels, the attempt to construct civil defence simultaneously as a fun activity and a vital plank in the nation's defence proved as problematic as the previous emphasis on duty had been. Overall, then, the article will conclude that the government's various attempts at inspiring recruitment were fundamentally unstable in the early cold war. At first there was a failure to understand the contingent nature of the link between citizenship and service in the Second World
War and assuming its applicability after 1945. Once this was understood, messages designed to have more appeal were produced, but these struggled to reconcile the needs Even before the development of the hydrogen bomb forced a total reconceptualisation of civil defence in 1954 it is clear that recruitment was in crisis, a result of the failure of a citizenship discourse based on service and self-sacrifice to resonate sufficiently in the face of a cold war threat within a rapidly changing popular culture.
Recruitment strategy and the idea of 'failure'
The strategy aimed at recruiting volunteers during 1949-1953 was far from static, although throughout it relied on a strong lead from the central government and relied on certain key messages which consistently ran through the propaganda even as they were adapted and rephrased. When the recruitment campaign began in 1950, it rested on three elements: calls by Ministers, press advertising, and cinema films. Ministerial radio broadcasts and press conferences were a central cog in recruitment campaigns throughout the period. They usually inaugurated campaigns and emphasised the fact that service in civil defence was officially sanctioned, an approved participation in the nation's defence. Ministers delineated the threats to the nation, the necessity of civil defence in meeting them, and the need for individuals to sacrifice their time for this end.
Such leadership rhetoric helped set the discursive boundaries of recruitment propaganda, which in turn borrowed from and reinforced such rhetoric. National and local press advertisements, posters, and in 1950-51 cinematic efforts continued this process of encouragement, emphasising certain themes and messages designed to chime with the population. This effort was concentrated in annual autumnal recruitment campaigns, with the budget focused on a six month period between late September and spring the following year. The budget, never large, actually declined over the period -from 21 Ibid.
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The failure of civil defence recruitment must then be seen as relative to the expectations current within cold war British culture. Home Office ministers and officials were not alone in arguing that recruitment had failed: the press and the volunteers themselves lamented the lack of engagement among the public. 22 The periods when civil defence recruitment was at its most successful show that although the temperature of the cold war was an important factor, it was the resonance of representations of civil defence service within popular culture, or the lack of it, which ultimately determined the success of recruitment. High tension typified the period before the Korean War, 23 but civil defence recruitment failed dismally. After 1951, when the shock of Korea had subsided, tensions remained high but on an even keel, more care was devoted to constructing civil defence in a way designed to appeal to ordinary people. Ultimately, however, it was the fundamental tension between the core message of civil defence and cultural attitudes towards participation and citizenship which meant it could never succeed to the level the government wanted it to. This does not mean we should see civil defence recruitment as a failure, or argue that the public were apathetic regarding either it or the cold war threat -the numbers involved were too high for such a crass summary -but it does mean that we can argue that the culture of civil defence, and the assumptions of political culture concerning its popular appeal, were increasingly divorced from the realities of British culture. 'enrolment in the Corps should be regarded as a duty by able bodied citizens over military age'. 28 The main reason for this unexciting approach was the marked desire not to present civil defence as a 'panic' measure or as a prelude to all-out war: in July it was stressed that 'civil defence is an organisation of men and women coming together as neighbours to defend each other as neighbours… it is a local service'. preparations. In referring back to the war, propaganda was building on the assumption widely held before recruiting began that civil defence veterans would flock to the colours. 37 The war was also used as an example to inspire future recruits. In his speech calling for recruits, Attlee stressed 'How did we defeat the blitz in the last war? By the skill, devotion, courage and self-sacrifice of thousands of ordinary citizens. If war should come again, which God forbid, we must be ready'. 38 As we shall see below, civil defence propaganda drew heavily on the war years to stress the comradeship and fulfilment people would gain from service in civil defence.
Using the war to promote cold war civil defence in this way had its drawbacks, however. Linking the two periods together was intended to provide an uncontentious exemplar of patriotic civil defence activity, but it also served to strengthen the idea that civil defence remained essentially unchanged in character. In late 1949, the Daily Mirror ran a story about the sole volunteer for civil defence in the rural area around Dartford in Kent. In the story the volunteer tells the reader that 'I am surprised to find myself standing alone like this. I was proud to do my bit in the war', also that she possessed a suitcase full of wartime 'relics…. My family pull leg about it, but I don't mind'. 39 Here cold war civil defence was a direct reconstruction of the Second World War, and a comical one at that. This view that civil defence was unchanged from the war was resisted within the propaganda. Attlee concluded his recruitment speech by declaring that 'We must have volunteers now to join those who have already started training. Many people are still saying "I will be there on the day", but that won't be good enough'. 40 Using the war to encourage recruits, then, was problematic and 36 Ibid. 'Have we to face another war?', national press advertisement, 1950. 
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To convince people to join, a 'good reason' was provided, and they were often related to events in the war which have inspired the volunteer. A housewife joined because in the last war she 'drove an ambulance in the Coventry "blitz"; in Coventry's worst raid she was sent on an incident which turned out to be her own home -destroyed'. 56 A vandriver 'returned one night' from work 'to find his own home destroyed. Others helped his family then and he feels it is his duty to be ready to help others now'. 57 Further highlighting the centrality of the war in the 1951-52 campaign, all the people featured (apart from the youngest women) had excellent war records. They served in the military, or in civil defence, and many were decorated. By tying their previous service to the need to take part in civil defence 'today' the 'good reasons' for joining were of course strengthened. Practical or 'commonsense' reasons were also provided such as 'in case the balloon goes up', 58 or because 'she has always believed in the saying "work for peace, prepare for war"'. 59 These might appear vague, but when combined with the wartime service of featured volunteers it serves as another reminder that the lessons of the last war were valid for the cold war confrontation. In short, they were exemplifying the 'you can't be certain -you can be ready' slogan.
The veterans of the last conflict, committing themselves to this one, were represented as the exemplars of good citizenship. For those without the experience of war, stronger motives for joining up were provided. One young woman stressed the 'worthwhile' nature of the work whilst another 'knows that she can be of help to Liverpool's citizens if the need arises'. 60 If these 'good reasons' focus on providing help to others -the community, or neighbours -the comradeship experienced by many during the war was 55 Ibid. you've got a real place in the community'. 68 In other advertisements, civil defence was described as a 'band of good neighbours', 69 full of 'people who know their neighbours, who take part in the fun -and the responsibilities -of community life'. 70 An integral part of this focus was to depict civil defence as up and running, with people already taking part and enjoying themselves. Whereas before it was duty, a chore even, now it was fun and a place to find 'new interests, new friends'. 71 Nor was the reason for civil defence neglected, although it had been transmuted -much less was said about defence, and virtually nothing about attack. Instead, the advertisements emphasised peace, and the role the volunteers were playing in it. As one advertisement put it, 'men and women, 'duty' seen as male character traits, the iconography of civil defence was overwhelmingly masculine. The earliest images showed men taking centre stage: the three national advertisements produced in late 1950 featured only one rather passive woman compared to nine men. 75 In the recruitment film The Waking Point (1950), it was a man who joined, and the main female role was his wife who attempted to dissuade him from joining. After 1951, the production of advertising emphasising individual narratives allowed a more diverse set of images. Whereas the previous 'general' appeals had emphasised maleness, the more specific appeals featured numerous women. These exemplars of civil defence -many veterans of the warpersuaded women to join in a way that other appeals did not. Narratives featuring 72 Ibid. 'Don't leave it all to us', national advertising, 1952/53. This conflict between creating exciting roles for women and the refusal to countenance any innovation in this area is highlighted by a curious set of exchanges between the Home Office and regional civil defence offices about women joining the all-male preserve of the rescue section. Some local groups had allowed women to join the rescue section, prompting a discussion about whether they should be officially 'banned'. 80 The imbedded attitudes can be seen from the attitude of one civil servant who argued in 1954 that 'the full work of the rescue section is beyond the capabilities of a normal woman and I hardly think it advisable that the Home Office launch a campaign to recruit those who are not normal'. 81 In general, however, the Home Office sought to reconcile the issue quietly, perhaps mindful of the wartime debate about female members of the Home Guard. 82 Reluctant to rule that women could join the section, but also reluctant to punish the women in question by excluding them, on reading the exchanges one is left with the impression that the Home Office would be happy to turn a blind eye to it, which considering that the issue was raised intermittently without a firm decision being made until the early 1960s, seems to be what they did.
In addition to including more women in propaganda images, these years also saw highly gendered advertisements aimed at specific sections of the Corps. For example, one poster and local advertisement declared in unambiguous terms 'this is man's job', and featured drawings of manly activities such as rescuing people and operating 76 Ibid. 'Can you look after people?', local advertising, 1952/53. 20 machinery (Fig.3) . 83 Such images suggest a desire to separate male civil defence service from notions of passivity, as does the stress on civil defence's contribution to national 'strength'. Likewise another poster from the same series which aimed to encourage volunteers to the welfare section rather than rescue declared 'where a woman's help is needed', and in the place of the manly activities showed cooking, caring and formfilling. 84 A poster was also produced which cried 'there's a job for women too!'.
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Considering that by the end of December 1952 women actually outnumbered men in the Corps, this message must have seemed to some hardly worth stressing. It does illustrate,
however, that for all the numbers of women in the Corps, it was still represented mainly as a 'male activity'. Despite making up a third of the section, for example, men were very rarely portrayed in advertisements aimed at the ambulance section. 
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The 1952/53 campaign was also the first to encourage the house-to-house canvass as a method of recruiting, and there can be no doubt that the representations of neighbourliness and community spirit were designed to encourage a positive response to the house-to-house call. Moreover, it was an approach that appeared to deliver results.
In As the house-to-house canvass, linked to the emphasis on community, was perceived to have paid real dividends in terms of securing recruits, the 1953-54 campaign was dominated by these two strands. Yet within this campaign there was a return to older narratives of citizenship and duty which appear hard to explain, but which became entrenched in the new appeal. The importance of the canvass can be gauged from the advice sent to local authorities. National and local advertising was designed to soften up potential recruits, but 'in the present climate of public opinion only a personal interview will persuade them to enrol and start training'. 88 This guidance issued by the COI allows us to analyse advice to canvassers although we cannot reconstruct the face-to-face meetings of canvassers and potential recruits. In particular, the characteristics deemed necessary for the 'suitable' canvasser in the advice can shed light on how civil defence was constructed by the COI and provide hints as to the interaction taking place on the doorstep. The 'qualities' needed were 'personality, patience, perseverance, sincerity and courage'. 89 However, 'only a small proportion of volunteers' would actually be suitable.
The suggested qualities were redolent of the projection of the 'average' civil defence volunteer in the advertising, but were obviously sadly lacking in the real-life volunteers.
Also suggested were ideal 'openings' to conversation and ways of overcoming
reluctance.
To open, potential recruits were to be told 'we have a number of people already enrolled but we still need willing hands to come forward. We need men for the warden, rescue and headquarters section, and we are particularly in need of ladies for the welfare section and the ambulance section'. So despite the fact that women made up a third of the headquarters section and men some 39 per cent of the ambulance section, 90 both were assigned to specific genders on the doorstep. were being 'weeded out' of the service). 99 Although the level of new recruits in the hydrogen bomb era was typically only half that of the atomic age, it does suggest the messages of self-improvement and associational benefits used to sell civil defence from the late 1950s overrode, at least for some, the sustained criticism the Corps received at this time. 100 In short, although civil defence's role in the nation's defence was of major importance in motivating recruits, it seems that the leisure opportunities it provided were equally central in encouraging recruits.
Conclusion
The various appeals for civil defence volunteers contained basic contradictions which explain why the Corps struggled to achieve its target membership levels. There were always tensions in this approach, however. Civil defence could never compete with other leisure activities for the spare time of potential recruits -and there was always an awareness that it was among the patriotic that civil defence would find its recruits. Moreover, the idea of civil defence as something the ideal citizen should be doing was always present, although in relative abeyance during the 1951-53 period with its emphasis on leisure. The 1953/54 campaign, with its noticeable return to the notion of 'responsibility' wrapped in its focus on 'neighbourliness' was an attempt to square this circle -only those who felt this responsibility were ever likely to join. The previous campaigns had been built on the assumption that people understood the need for civil defence but required a little push, and perhaps the final campaign of the atomic age recognised that such a sense of responsibility was declining and was itself in need of a shove. Civil defence recruiters were facing an uphill battle and for all their attempts at polishing the message, the basic core values of civil defence were becoming increasingly divorced from the core values of British citizens as the 1950s wore on. In the 1940s the threat of enemy invasion and the experience of attack had helped bring about a paradigmatic shift in the relationship between state and citizen -and the unstinting service of the people in wartime was a corollary of that. In the 1950s, cold war tensions, simmering but never boiling over, could not replicate those conditions.
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More than that, it can be argued that they could never again be replicated, that the Britain of the 1950s was decisively different from the nation of the wartime years. The new cultural emphasis on home, family, privacy and affluence (and the security of those, rather than the nation) were harbingers of a major shift in the relationship between the individual, the nation, and the local. The shifts in civil defence propaganda hint at these changes, but in a way which obviously existed in tension with the patriotic and communitarian rhetoric implicit in all civil defence activity. In many ways, the volunteer cohort imagined within civil defence propaganda was illusory, the patriotic and the individualistic seemed hard to reconcile. Yet, as we know, the messages were powerful and persuasive enough to persuade hundreds of thousands of people to join.
For these people -whether they were patriotic 'cold warriors', veterans who wanted to recreate the blitz, or simply bored individuals who wanted to do their bit or learn new skills -the Civil Defence Corps was a site of leisure activity, friendly association, and patriotic engagement. Although service in civil defence was rejected by the vast majority of people, it was still a popular success, with many people finding deep satisfaction in what others might see as its peculiar mix of nuclear defence and camaraderie.
